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Two Is Company and Two Can Be a Quorum: 
A Reply to Professor Sanchez 
Dennis P. Walsh* 
Professor John Sanchez has aptly laid out the arguments on both sides 
of the issue concerning the authority of the two-member quorum of a three-
member panel to continue issuing decisions.1  He concludes, however, that 
the D.C. Circuit2 reached the correct conclusion based on the plain language 
of the statute, i.e., that there must at all times be three members on the 
NLRB for any group of Board members to make binding decisions.3  In this 
comment, I will not attempt to set forth all of the arguments on the other 
side.  Those arguments have been thoroughly presented to the Supreme 
Court in the parties’ briefs in the New Process case,4 and the Supreme Court 
has now rendered its decision on the issue.5  Instead, I will point out the 
primary flaws in the rationale of the D.C. Circuit that Professor Sanchez 
endorses, and will contend that the Supreme Court should have read the 
plain language of the statute to support the Board’s authority to continue to 
issue decisions through a two-member quorum of a three-member panel to 
which the Board had properly delegated its powers.  In addition, I will 
briefly address the issue of retroactivity of the Court’s decision, about 
which Professor Sanchez speculates in his article. 
First, an area of agreement.  The Court correctly decided the two-
member quorum issue on the basis of the plain language of Section 3(b) of 
the Act.  The issue of whether the Court should defer to the Board’s inter-
                                                                                                                           
 * Dennis P. Walsh is currently the Deputy General Counsel at the Federal Labor Relations   
Authority.  Mr. Walsh previously served as a Member of the National Labor Relations Board on three 
different occasions.  Mr. Walsh was a Board Member from December 30, 2000 to December 20, 2001 
under a recess appointment by President Clinton.  He served again from December 17, 2002 to Decem-
ber 16, 2004, after being nominated by President Bush and confirmed by the Senate.  He received a 
recess appointment to serve as a Member of the Board on January 17, 2006 and served on the Board 
until the Senate recessed on December 31, 2007.   Mr. Walsh is currently an Adjunct Professor of Labor 
Law at Howard University School of Law.  Mr. Walsh holds a J.D. from Cornell Law School and a B.A. 
from Hamilton College. 
1     John Sanchez, Two Is Company but Is It a Quorum?, 5 FIU L. REV. 715 (2010). 
 2 Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 3 Sanchez, supra note 1, at 720. 
 4 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, rev’d, No. 08-
1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010) (No. 08-1457). 
 5 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. 
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pretation under the Court’s Chevron decision6 was not addressed in the oral 
argument.7  The government, on behalf of the Board, argued that the plain 
meaning of the statute supports its interpretation and only argued for defer-
ence as a backup.8  In any event, it is by no means clear that Chevron defer-
ence is even applicable to this issue.  As Professor Sanchez notes, two   
Circuit Courts – the Second and the Tenth9 – relied on Chevron deference in 
upholding the authority of the two-Member quorum.  Each court, however, 
concluded that Chevron deference was applicable based on the fact that the 
statutory language is ambiguous, as evidenced in part by the D.C. Circuit 
reading it one way, while other courts read it just the opposite.10  When the 
Court speaks of statutory ambiguity in Chevron, however, it is not neces-
sarily referring to semantic ambiguity.  Rather, it is referring to the fact that 
Congress deliberately left some statutory language unclear, with the intent 
that the agency charged with administering the statute would have the    
authority to interpret and apply the language based on its accumulated   
experience and policy judgment.11  Congress almost certainly did not leave 
the language of Section 3(b) ambiguous so that the Board would have the 
authority to interpret whether or not it even had the authority to act in the 
first place.  In fact, while courts have held that administrative agencies, 
including the Board, have the authority to determine their own “jurisdic-
tion,” the term “jurisdiction” when used in that sense refers to the extent of 
their substantive authority with regard to particular areas of the law, not to 
their power to act in the first place.12 
In any event, the simple fact that the words of a statute might be     
ambiguous does not necessarily imply that Congress has implicitly        
                                                                                                                           
 6 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stating that if 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, courts should accord deference to the 
agency delegated the power to interpret the statute if its interpretation is a permissible construction of 
the statute). 
 7 Justice Breyer alluded to the issue when he questioned whether the Court “should” read the 
statute to invalidate the two-member decisions, while it could also be read to authorize them.  Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 15, New Process Steel, L.P. (No. 08-1457).  He did not phrase his questions, how-
ever, in terms of deference to the Board’s interpretation under Chevron. 
 8 Brief for Respondent NLRB at 32-34, New Process Steel, L.P., No. 08-1457 (U.S. Feb. 2, 
2010). 
 9 Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849, 850-52 (10th Cir. 2009), vacated No. 
09-1404, slip op. (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 419-24 (2d Cir. 
2009), vacated No. 09-328, slip op. (U.S. June 28, 2010). 
 10 Teamsters Local Union No. 523, 590 F.3d at 852; Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 423-24. 
 11 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
 12 See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 464 U.S. 822, 830 n.7 (1984).  In fact, however, the 
Court has not definitively resolved the issue of whether it must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its 
statutory authority to regulate a particular area of the law.  Compare Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Missis-
sippi ex rel. Moore, 485 U.S. 354, 380-82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring), with id. at 386-91 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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delegated to the administrative agency the authority to resolve that ambigui-
ty.  Especially when it comes to issues concerning the authority of the    
agency to act in the first place, the courts are just as capable of resolving 
issues of grammar and semantics as an administrative agency.  And the fact 
that courts disagree about the meaning of particular sentences and phrases 
does not necessarily even mean that they could have different, plausible 
meanings; it could very well be that one court is correct and another is not.  
In this case, it could be that the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuits have read the language of Section 3(b) correctly and the D.C.    
Circuit has read it incorrectly, or the other way around.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court itself correctly resolved the conflict based on its view of the correct 
way to read the words of the statute. 
Professor Sanchez reads the words of the statute the same as the D.C. 
Circuit when he concludes that “there must at all times be three members 
on the NLRB for any group of Board members to render binding deci-
sions.”13  The problem with this interpretation is that it robs the term   
“quorum” of its true meaning.  A quorum is “the minimum number of 
members who must be present for a deliberative assembly to legally     
transact business.”14  Thus, for an adjudicatory body, a quorum sets the min-
imum number of members of the body who must be available to participate 
in a decision.15  The D.C. Circuit’s reading, on the other hand, gives the 
word an entirely different meaning.  Instead of setting a minimum          
participation   level, the D.C. Circuit (and Professor Sanchez) would read 
the word to set a minimum membership level on the Board before any deci-
sion could be made.  Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, even if the Board 
has delegated its authority to a three-member panel, that panel cannot make 
decisions with two members if there are no longer three members sitting on 
the Board.  This interpretation changes a quorum requirement – i.e., the 
number of members who must be available to participate in a decision – 
into a membership requirement – i.e., the number of members who must be 
available, period. 
This anomaly can be avoided if the words of the statute are simply 
given their ordinary and natural meaning, as the canons of statutory       
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(“A three-member Board may delegate its powers to a three-member group, and this delegee group may 
act with two members so long as the Board quorum requirement is, ‘at all times,’ satisfied.”).  
 14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (8th ed. 2004). 
 15 See Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 1980) (stat-
ing a quorum “is a protection against totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an 
unduly small number of persons”) (quoting ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER 16 (3d ed. 1970)). 
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construction require.16  The quorum provision in Section 3(b) of the Act 
states that “three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a 
quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of 
any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof [i.e., the authority 
to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers 
which it may itself exercise].”17  The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation relies 
heavily on the words “at all times.”  In that court’s view, “at all times” 
means that the Board shall “at all times” have three members, or it cannot 
operate at all.  This reading, however, fails to give the following phrase, 
“except that . . .” any real meaning.  If read properly, that phrase establishes 
an exception to the three-member quorum requirement when the Board has 
delegated its authority to three members.  Thus, “at all times” does not truly 
mean that the Board must “at all times” have three sitting members,       
because the statute sets forth an explicit “exception” to the three-member 
quorum requirement. 
The D.C. Circuit reads the “except” clause as simply meaning that 
there is a different quorum requirement for a three-member group, which 
does not create a true exception to the three-member quorum for the full 
Board.18  This is the reading, however, that results in the term “quorum” 
having an import that is entirely different from its accepted meaning.     
Under this interpretation, even if a properly constituted three-member panel 
has two members available to make a decision, there is no quorum unless 
the Board has at least three of its five slots filled.  Thus, the term quorum 
would in effect have two different meanings:  two members of the panel 
would have to be available to make the decision, and three members would 
have to be sitting on the Board before that decision could be made.  By   
failing to understand the two-member quorum requirement as a true excep-
tion, the court (and Professor Sanchez) has created an entirely different 
meaning for the word “quorum.” 
In a very real sense, therefore, the authority of the two-member    
quorum of the Board should have turned on the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of one word, the word “except,” and how that word fits into the delega-
tion, vacancy, and quorum provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act.  In order to 
give the word “quorum” its true meaning, in my view, the Court should 
have concluded that “except” means “except,” i.e., that it establishes a true 
exception to the three-member quorum requirement when the Board has 
delegated its powers to a three-member group. 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be 
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”). 
 17 National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006).  
 18 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472. 
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Professor Sanchez cites a number of policy concerns in support of his 
conclusion that Section 3(b) does not authorize the Board to issue decisions 
with a two-member quorum.  These include the concern that a two-member 
quorum cannot consider decisions involving major policy shifts or changes 
in precedent, and the concern that the individual Board members who com-
prised the two-member quorum have suppressed their personal views and 
followed current precedent so that the decisions could issue.19  In essence, 
these concerns are based on the view that two members are simply not a 
sufficiently representative complement to decide cases at the National   
Labor Relations Board.  It is Congress, however, that has determined the 
absolute minimum number of members that constitute “a protection against 
totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an unduly small 
number of persons.”20  And if the two-member quorum provision is properly 
read as an “exception” to the three-member quorum requirement when the 
Board’s powers have been delegated to the three-member group, then    
Congress has decided the policy issue – i.e., two members are sufficient 
protection when such a delegation has been made. 
Professor Sanchez also speculates whether the Court’s decision that 
the Board lacked a statutory quorum should be retroactive, or prospective 
only.  He opines that it could be given limited prospective effect, in the 
sense that it would apply to “all currently pending NLRB cases plus all 
pending appeals from NLRB rulings,” but not to “all previously decided 
and unappealed NLRB rulings and rulings appealed, decided and not the 
subject of a pending cert petition.”21  However, the problem with only pro-
spectively applying such a ruling – even if the prospective application is 
limited – is that, if the Board truly acted without a quorum, it had no      
authority to act at all.  This would make any decision issued by a two-
member Board a nullity.22  Any action by the Court that allowed any Board 
decisions to stand if they were not issued by a properly constituted quorum 
would fly in the face of this principle. 
The issue Professor Sanchez raises is more properly considered, in my 
view, as a question of whether a party has waived its objection to a Board’s 
decision by not raising the two-member quorum issue, either to the Board 
itself or on appeal to a circuit court.  The weight of authority would seem to 
indicate that the issue cannot be waived.  The D.C. Circuit has held that 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Sanchez, supra note 1, at 732. 
 20 Assure Competitive Transp., 629 F.2d at 473. 
 21 Sanchez, supra note 1, at 734. 
 22 See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 79 (2003) (stating that decision by improperly con-
stituted panel of Circuit Court is an action that the Court never had authority to take in first place); R.R. 
Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that issue of agency’s 
composition concerns question of agency’s power to act at all). 
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issues concerning the composition of an agency, and thus its power to act at 
all, cannot be waived by failing to raise them with the agency itself before 
appealing to the courts.23  And the Supreme Court held that the failure to 
raise the issue of the proper composition of a circuit court of appeals before 
the circuit court itself did not waive a party’s right to raise it for the first 
time before the Supreme Court.24  Thus, since they are still appealable to the 
circuit courts, Board decisions decided by the two-member quorum remain 
vulnerable to challenge based on the Court’s ruling that they were not 
properly decided.  Indeed, Section 10(f) of the Act25 contains no deadline 
for filing a petition for review of a Board decision, so this would mean that 
an appeal of such decisions could be filed at any time. 
Because the Court decided in New Process that the two-member   
quorum was not empowered to issue decisions, it has left the newly consti-
tuted Board to determine what it will do with the remaining decisions that 
were decided by two members.  As Professor Sanchez quite aptly describes, 
its choice is either to ratify those decisions based on a cursory review – 
which would leave them open to possible challenge on due process grounds 
– or to start at square one with every decision – which would increase the 
Board’s backlog at a time when it has many important issues before it.    
Neither proposition is very attractive.26  Instead, if the Court had properly 
read Section 3(b) as embodying a true two-member quorum exception when 
the Board properly delegates its authority to a three-member panel, then 
today’s Board would have been free to focus on important questions of    
labor-management policy in its current caseload. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Mitchell v. Christopher, 996 F.2d 375, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1993); R.R. Yardmasters, 721 F.2d 
at 1337-39. 
 24 Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 78-79. 
 25 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2006). 
 26 In fact, the newly constituted Board seems to have taken an approach somewhere in between 
these extremes.  It has asked the circuit courts to remand all of the cases that were challenged on the 
basis of the lack of a quorum, and it has assigned those cases for consideration by a panel consisting of 
Members Liebman and Schaumber, both of whom were on the two-member panel that originally   
decided them, and one of the new members of the Board.  See NLRB Press Release, NLRB Outlines 
Plans for Considering 2-Member Cases in Wake of Supreme Court Ruling (July 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2010/R-2762.pdf. 
